On the Pitch

Udine vs Lazio's 1:0: whatever happened to Italian defending?

Wed, 22 May 2013 04:40:24 +0200

Much can be said about the decline of the Serie A; the most prominent victim of its slow pace this year was Andrea Pirlo, whom teams from the bottom of the table still pay incredible tribute that comes in the precious currency of vast space, i.e. time, in build-up play. Which showed when the stingy pressing of Bayern’s Müller, Mandzukic et al. rendered him entirely ineffective during the Champions League quarter-finals, and Antonio Conte was right in his remarks afterwards how the Serie A was holding back his side’s European ambitions.

One strength of Italian football has always been its astute tactics, in particular everything defense, both team tactics but also its defenders on a more granular level.

But there was some odd defending on display in a recent match between Udine and Lazio, allowing di Natale to score a nice volley.

Udine is in possession on its left wing. Marius Stankevicius (34) confronts the player on the ball, Gabriel Antunes da Silva (also 34), while Giuseppe Biava (20) is sort of marking Roberto Pereyra (37), but does not follow him all the way to the edge of the field, which is Stankevicius’ marking zone.

At this point, which Biava seems to try to indicate with his gestures towards the Lithuanian, Stankevicius should have dropped back to mark the attacker deeper in his zone.

Now, when da Silva passes to Pereyra and runs outside-in towards the box, something even more odd happens; Stankevicius just turns around and follows him. He really should have held his position by following the pass at the edge of the field, but instead his run after da Silva forces Biava to move towards Pereyra thereby opening the door to Silva’s run into the box. He receives the ball back from Pereyra and crosses into the box where di Natale (10) puts the ball into the back of the net with a beautiful volley.

My drawing shows above all that, as a result, the runs of Biava and Stankevicius cross each other, which is something that just should not happen.

Having said that, this situation would also have needed a third defender on the scene from the very beginning, as you don’t want to play two vs two on your wing this deep. A holding midfielder could have shielded the crucial space in front of Biava. Speaking bigger picture, this scene might point to the downside of defending with three, or five defenders respectively, on the back line instead of with a pure back-four.

Augsburg vs Nuremberg: Far East dominates Bavarian derby

Sat, 09 Mar 2013 13:35:10 +0100

I’m excited about every single Japanese or South Korean player joining Bundesliga clubs. I’m yet to see one whose technical skills aren’t impeccable.

Shinji Kagawa opened the door for players from the Far East and there are now about half a dozen sides to which they are crucial. Even in last night’s match between two Bavarian provincial clubs they took center stage.

Nuremberg fielded Hiroshi Kiyotake, signed this summer from Cerezo Osaka where he succeeded Kagawa. (Mu Kanazaki, signed just this winter, remained on the bench.) Augsburg fielded two Korean players, Koo Ja-Cheol and Ji Dong-Wong, both on loan from Wolfsburg and Sunderland, respectively.

All three were key to the match, if in very different ways.

Kiyotake played center midfield in Nuremberg’s 4-1-4-1 formation. Koo Ja-Cheol played as one of two holding midfielders in what I thought ended up as a pretty standard 4-4-2 formation. Augsburg has routinely used both 4-1-4-1 and 4-2-3-1 this season, but the one-match ban for skipper Daniel Baier probably prompted Augsburg coach Markus Weinzierl to move Koo into a deeper role and change tactics. Ji played in more in a striker role close to Sascha Mölders.

The result looked tighter than the match really was, due to Raphael Schäfer’s once-a-career goalkeeping blunder. Aside from a brief period ahead of its equalizer in the 36th minute, Augsburg never really managed to threaten Nuremberg’s goal. In particular during the entire second half I hardly noticed any goal scoring opportunities for the side.

In build-up play, Augsburg’s holding midfielders Andreas Ottl and Koo dropped deep and moved very close to the full-backs. In particular Koo had plenty of space here to demonstrate his impressive technical skills as Markus Feulner struggled to close him down. Koo to me was the dominating player of the match (84 times on the ball).

But Ottl and Koo consistently failed to then link up with the rest of Augsburg’s midfield and its strikers and as a result the side broke up in two parts when in possession. In between, Nuremberg’s midfield controlled the centre pitch at most times.

This is where Ji disappointed. He was hardly to be seen during the entire match as he failed to drop into the space in the back of Kiyotake and Feulner that invariably opens up when the 4-1-4-1’s centre midfielders press high during the opponent’s build-up play. Koo and Augsburg’s defender were hardly ever able to play vertical passes through Nuremberg’s midfield.

Kiyotake’s impact on the match was less tactical in nature. He impressed with his clinical finishing, his two-feet ball control as well as his dribblings (a bunch of Augsburg defenders had to resort to a foul to prevent him from penetrating the box, and Alexander Esswein netted the resulting free kick).

Augsburg struggled in particular to prevent him from linking up with left-wing Esswein.

I don’t think any of these three players will stay in Bavaria for long. Wolfsburg has already said Koo will return (never quite understood why former Wolfsburg coach Felix Magath sidelined the player last year). Not sure whether Ji would return to Sunderland but it’s difficult to see him play in Germany’s second division where Augsburg will likely end up despite its impressive run lately. And Kiyotake will also be poached next summer at the latest by a club with more financial prowess than Nuremberg.

Freiburg vs Frankfurt: see you in Europe?

Sat, 23 Feb 2013 21:13:00 +0100

Two teams many thought would be content to avoid relegation this season are now vying for Bundesliga’s fourth Champions League seat instead.

Both sides boast a tradition of being very comfortable on the ball, but there’s no other commonality. Freiburg is one of the poorest clubs of the league and mostly has to do with the output of its excellent youth center (supplemented with some African players, a legacy of the passion of long-time coach Volker Finke for the continent’s players). Frankfurt has more money, but in recent history often less than it thought, and has often built its sides around outstanding individual players. Only in recent years the club has managed to move on from its past image as Bundesliga’s moody and chaotic diva.

Their encounter last night saw two very different half-times. Frankfurt clearly dominated the first half and Freiburg was lucky not to concede a goal as Frankfurt’s Austrian striker/winger Stefan Aigner left several chances unused. Frankfurt displayed its excellent passing, with the technically averse Sebastian Jung, Sebastian Rode and Pirmin Schwegler shaping passing triangles Freiburg struggled to get its grip on.

Freiburg did not once manage to threaten Frankfurt’s goal during the first half. It seemed surprised by Frankfurt’s rare diamond in which Meier efficiently worked against Freiburg build-up play. Frankfurt controlled the centre of the pitch and Freiburg’s 4-4-2 constantly looked outnumbered as a result. It works impressively well when Max Kruse and Jan Rosenthal, two midfielders, play upfront but constantly drop deep when in possession, adding numbers in midfield and dragging the opponent’s defenders out of position, making it one of the most interesting formations to watch in Bundesliga.

But last night it looked like the pure, out-dated 4-4-2. Rosenthal tried to act into midfield but his many unforced errors and weak first touch meant Freiburg struggled to get the ball into Frankfurt’s third of the pitch second striker Karim Guede from time to time took up positions on the wings, but it wasn’t enough to shake up one of Frankfurt’s key qualities, the excellent organisation of space when not in possession. The side earns a lot of praise this year for its strong offense, but its defense lines again maintained just the right, narrow distance between each other.

When a side is inferior in such a way, change can only come from outside the pitch and early on in the match the only question was what Freiburg’s up-and-coming coach Christian Streich would do about it. The problems were so obvious I thought he would react during half-time, but it took about fifteen minutes longer for his solution, which was excellent. He replaced Guede with Johannes Flum (another graduate of the club’s own youth center), and allowed Kruse to move into a more central and more flexible role from where he could act more efficiently into midfield and then, off the defense’s radar, move back into strike position.

This completely changed the match dynamics, Frankfurt was pushed deeper and deeper into its own half. Freiburg finally created goal scoring opportunities, even if most from set pieces, but missed four really excellent ones. During the last 20 to 30 minutes of the match the team managed to create the passing triangles its link-up play desperately needs. Now Frankfurt looked outnumbered at every turn as it suddenly failed to get a grasp on the very agile Kruse and Flum.

Where is all this going to end up? Frankfurt ranks fourth and Freiburg fifth. At first glance, Freiburg’s run looks less sustainable. The side has recently put in some unusually poor performances with very few goal scoring opportunities in particular at home, where the opponent is content defending in deeper positions. Bundesliga’s mid-section is very balanced and tight this season, with teams shuffling between rank six and twelve almost every week. But then again it’s easy to underestimate a side whose strength is based on team work and tactics, and with no individual players standing out.

What the German FA really thinks of English football

Sun, 03 Feb 2013 09:10:51 +0100

England has produced the best football bloggers as well the most watched — and arguably the best — football league.

But leafing through the Euro analysis by a technical committee of the German football association DFB the other day I was struck how far behind the English national team really is.

“On defense England formed two banks of four sitting fairly deep, shuffling left and right over the width of the pitch. The two attackers up front were disconnected from the defensive block by quite a large margin, conceding space to the opposition. Active pressing geared towards winning possession was nowhere to be seen; attackers were merely “escorted”, only the player closest to man on the ball applied some pressure.

“On offense England was quite predictable and one-dimensional in their attempts to feed long diagonal balls to their wingers. In spite of pacey players like Young, Wilmer, Walcott, Welbeck or Rooney England lacked both punch and flexibility on the break. Deficiencies in creative play from the central offensive position and lack of elements of surprise were noticeable, as was lack of fitness.” (Translation JP/JJ)

Quite a contrast with the commentary on the other teams, but probably a fair assessment. England’s play was a far cry from the performances of Italy, Spain, Germany etc., but more importantly also from the innovations presented by smaller teams like Portugal and in particular Denmark.

When the latest toy is no fun – comparing three ways to set up a winger

Fri, 18 Jan 2013 16:45:00 +0100

No other player inspires officials and fans over the summer as much as the winger. Of all the new toys bought by the club’s manager, it’s the winger who sparkles and shines all over while the new centre-back is hardly noticed. The fans are all excited about the high speed one-on-ones, the spectacular dribbling and efficient crosses seen on youtube clips of the player’s previous clubs.

But a few weeks later disappointment often prevails. The new toy is no fun. The winger plays okay, lands an assist every now and then but there’s just nothing spectacular about his play.

But its hardly his fault, as a winger depends on how he is set up maybe more than any other position in modern football. There’s (probably) three different ways to set up a modern winger of the 4-3-3 kind (and the 4-2-3-1 or 4-1-4-1 variations).

1. Ground passes in build-up play. It’s a tedious, but fairly save way to reach your winger, but it also gives the opponent ample time to shift his defense to the relevant side of the pitch. If the opposing side is well-organized, it has closed down all space by the time the ball has reached the winger (who is also facing his own goal when he gets the ball, putting him dead in the water from the start) – unless the attacking team displays superior, lightning fast passing, which is rare.

Summary: Little risk, but quite inefficient unless passing is extremely fast.

2. Wide balls from one side of the pitch to the other. This approach looks very efficient when it works, but its also much riskier as these passes are obviously difficult to control by the winger. I think in the end very few players have the ability to control these balls quickly while running at high speed whereas most need enough time to allow the opposing full-back to corner the winger until reinforcements arrive.

Summary: Very efficient approach, but high risk of losing possession. (Which in turn does not put the side at risk as most players are behind the ball when possession is lost, unlike option 3.)

3. Vertical passes (to a lone striker) combined with passes through the opposing back-four. This approach allows the winger to gather speed off-ball in anticipation of a later pass (i.e. the opposing full-back can’t respond to this run) and then run into a ball that is much easier to control than a long pass (see 2). Even without a through-pass as the ideal finishing touch, the vertical passes of the attack’s first stage prevent the opposing full-backs from taking up wide positions, giving natural space to the wingers. Needs good passing and good fine-tuning between midfield and strikers. Also needs midfielders who don’t spend time on the ball to avoid off-side positions. But above all a lone striker who can be sought with his back to the goal.

Summary: the most efficient way to set up a winger with medium risk to lose the ball, but also the most ambitious approach. (Most top teams have developed this further into formations without classical wingers, with players on the wings rotating with centre midfielders).

So when your lone striker is average, by default are your wingers. In a striking example taken from this Bundesliga season and despite quite a decent performance, Werder Bremen never reached meaningful possession throughout its home match against Bayern Munich because neither its centre-backs nor its midfielders were ever able to play vertical passes to its lone striker Nils Petersen. Because option 3 was not at Werder’s disposal, the side’s midfield players made countless attempts at option 2 but none of their passes were precise enough to allow Marko Arnautovic or Eljero Elia to become effective on the wings.

Dortmund vs Schalke: a back-three disaster

Mon, 22 Oct 2012 11:22:11 +0200

Quite an earthquake shook the Bundesliga this weekend when Dortmund coach Jürgen Klopp fielded a back–three, more or less considered extinct in Germany. And Klopp’s move (in response to several injuries) didn’t help to reintroduce this formation at all as he had to correct his mistake after just 30 minutes and as his side suffered a humiliating home defeat against arch rival Schalke 04.

I thought there were three particular problems.

1. No build-up play. The three defenders Subotic, Hummels and Bender in their passing never efficiently linked up with Dortmund’s midfield, in particular its holding midfielder Kehl. Most of their passes played out merely between themselves, which gave Schalke ample time to deny space to Dortmund’s midfield. Build-up play has never been a particular strength of centre-backs Subotic and Hummels, which became evident in this somehow static formation. They looked much better on the ball when a holding midfielder such as Gundogan or back in the day Sahin dropped between or besides them (dynamizing the entire formation as well).

2. Combining Lewandowski and Reus in a two-striker formation didn’t add value but rather stripped both of them off their individual strengths. Reus is brilliant when he can either attack down the wing or drop deep and then penetrate the opponent’s back-four at the right moment. For example by linking up with a striker who is good at operating with his back to the goal – which in turn is Lewandowski’s big asset. He has paved the way to Dortmund’s pacy midfielders such as Kuba or Götze in a 4-2-3-1 formation countless times (and did so minutes after Klopp switched to his usual formation, creating the side’s first chance of the match).

3. Jefferson Farfan is one of Bundesliga’s best wingers and Dortmund’s defense lacked width to counter his runs in the back of left midfielder Großkreutz. He didn’t really charge down the wing every two minutes, but he did set up Schalke’s crucial first goal after just over ten minutes.

There were two instances before the first goal were Dortmund clearly outnumbered Schalke in midfield when the triangle Leitner-Reus-Piszczek linked up. But the side’s passing wasn’t strong enough to exploit this natural advantage.

The team also seemed unsure how to make use of maybe its biggest strength during the past two to three years, the pressing and counter-pressing that Klopp has drilled into the team. After the switch the side was visibly much more at ease in its usual formation, but it came too late, in particular as Schalke’s deadly counter-attack just after half-time already settled the match.

A self-made trap in build-up play – how Gladbach's Stranzl set up his own red card against Hamburg

Thu, 04 Oct 2012 08:30:50 +0200

The January 2011 signing of Martin Stranzl was one of the cornerstones to Lucien Favre’s efforts to save Borussia Mönchengladbach from certain relegation. The experienced centre-back helped a great deal to stabilise the side’s back-four, until then a very shaky affair. This summer, his side reached the Champions League qualifying stage.

In last week’s match against Hamburg, however, the 32-year old committed an awful mistake in build-up play, directly resulting in the double blow of a (unjustified) red card against the defender and a (missed) penalty for Hamburg.

Stranzl (39) receives a pass from full-back Jantschke (24) into the centre of the pitch. But instead of turning around by maybe 140 to 160 degrees to open up the pitch and to pass the ball onto the second centre-back Felipe (15), he simply lets the ball drop back to where it came from. He unwittingly plays into the attacking team’s hand by turning the pitch into a limited zone, in which three attackers attempt to win possession from just two defenders.

Illicevic (11) is charging from behind, but he was not close enough on his heels to put serious pressure on Stranzl. He simply failed to turn on the ball, which would allowed him to switch to the completely open side of the pitch. This was the very moment when I thought something is going to go very wrong now (even though it took Jantschke’s sloppy attempt to clear the ball as well to set up Illicevic’s fateful run into the penalty area), and two seconds later Stranzl is forced to risk everything against the attacker deep inside the penalty box with his tackle against Illicevic.

Football has evolved a lot over the past ten years, not only in terms of formations and bigger picture tactics. On an individual level, more and more players are able to make almost equal use of both their feet and their first touch’s aim is to the turn towards the pitch, establishing an open position that hands plenty of options for the next pass or run. Stranzl, however, closed down the pitch by returning the ball to where it came from, something that would probably not have happened to a 20-year old Bundesliga defender. It is no longer the current generation’s first instinct to let the ball drop to where it came from but to turn towards the pitch instead, having the confidence (and technical skills) of being able to shield the ball from an attacker during the turn.

No matter what level of competition you’re in, football is...

Wed, 03 Oct 2012 16:10:21 +0200

No matter what level of competition you’re in, football is all about making decisions.

Also, a bit of life advice: Don’t waste Vinnie Jones’ fucking time on a Sunday, by coming in and wankin’ it off. Ever.

Top five Bundesliga tactics to watch this season

Fri, 14 Sep 2012 22:29:00 +0200

It’s probably fair to say that the Bundesliga is not as tactically astute as La Liga and the Serie A in particular. The league has at times been slow to adapt innovations from abroad, for instance when the back four was introduced during in the 1990s. The Bundesliga also seems to offer fewer tactical variations with most teams having moved to one-striker formations over the past two or three years (some low budget teams have notably reverted to the classical 4-4-2 as well though as they could simply not afford a striker and central midfielder of the class a 4-2-3-1 requires). During the Euro, many observers in Germany were probably surprised that the 3-5-2 had not only survived in Italy but even helped to keep the Übermannschaft Spain in check (during the group stage match anyways).

Here’s what I see as the most interesting tactical developments to watch out for during the 50th Bundesliga season that just kicked off. Not in terms of overall trends, but looking at the individual teams.

1. Werder Bremen. Thomas Schaaf, the league’s longest-serving coach (since 1999), won fans throughout Germany with his side’s offensive play starting from around 2003 and throughout the 2000s. He perfected the diamond, and brilliant playmakers such as Johan Micoud, Diego and Mesut Özil made it shine very bright. But even during the good years the conviction was always to score one more goal than the side would conceive.

Schaaf interpreted the diamond in a very flexible way, with sometimes all midfielders taking up wild positions on the same wing during possession and the holding midfielder constantly joining the charge – as a result, the side was always prone for counterattacks for the lack of a second holding midfielder. It all collapsed when after the departure of Özil the inflow of outstanding players dried up due to some scoutings mishaps (the Brazilians Carlos Alberto, Wesley in particular, arguably Marko Marin as well). Schaaf tried hard but the individual qualities of his creative players just wouldn’t patch up the tactical holes any longer. Football had moved on, towards one-striker formations and two holding midfielders in particular, but Schaaf turned out to be a die-hard believer in two strikers. Werder was constantly outnumbered in midfield unless the strikers worked really hard against the ball. Most Bundesliga sides simply shut down the centre of the pitch, where Werder’s diamond lost itself in inefficient link-up play, and then counter-attacked down the wings that were left wide and open. In tactical terms, Werder constantly ranked bottom three during the past two Bundesliga seasons.

After an awful second leg (during which his side earned only 13 points), Schaaf has finally accepted the changes. Over the summer, the club signed Eljero Elia from Juventus, a pure winger, and the team has abandoned the diamond to move to a 4-1-4-1 formation, you may want to see it as 4-3-3 formation as well. But the point is that Schaaf has finally acknowledged that the wings can not be ignored in modern football. The opening match against Borussia Dortmund also showed that having two players on the wing in the default position when not in possession (instead of the midfielders constantly shuttling back and forth) provides the team with more defensive stability.

For the scale of the change after one decade of diamond play, Werder is one to watch during this Bundesliga season.

2. Borussia Mönchengladbach. Never before has a Bundesliga side evolved from near-certain relegation to reaching the Champions League qualification stage in a shorter time than Gladbach (around 15 months). And it’s been the work of one man: Lucien Favre. Gladbach’s last season was an outstanding example of what a coach can achieve by being obsessed with details.

Favre, however, did not create anything new but rather implemented something old in a perfect way. In my view (and other bloggers have had different views) Favre took an almost pure 4-4-2 formation to maybe its last height in the history of the league. The cornerstones were a well-organized back-four and well drilled, meticulous passing, in particular down the side’s right wing. You could see the same passing sequences over and over again and yet hardly any Bundesliga defense came to terms with the attacks’ pace and precision.

But then again, Favre could not have achieved the turn-around without the skills of one Marco Reus. His creativity and pace made this 4-4-2 formation work. The key feature of the team was that it could pose a threat to the goal with only one or two players ahead of the ball – the best protection against counter-attacks football has on offer. Again, much of this was down to Reus so that’s no longer going to be the case as the Bundesliga player of the year has moved on to Borussia Dortmund. Favre needs to fill the void – I would say the only means is tactical changes (even though the club has spent a lot of money over the summer, too). The replacement Luuk de Jong is a very different striker who needs the kind of crosses that Gladbach never bothered to develop last season thanks to its superior passing on the ground. But Favre seems to be reluctant to give up the 4-4-2 just yet.

3. Schalke 04. The club’s large fan base had only one thing in mind over the summer break: what’s going to happen after the departure of Senor Raul, revered like few other players in the club’s rich history?

The side needs to replace both Raul’s clinical finishing but maybe even more so his ability to sneak from midfield into the box at just the right moment. The club’s coach Huub Stevens started the season with a diamond with Lewis Holtby as playmaker but is more likely to opt for a 4-2-3-1 formation, in which Jefferson Farfan, on good days arguably the league’s best winger, thrives. Just before the closing of the transfer period the club also signed (on loan) Ibrahim Afellay, another potential winger. The departure of Raul should also allow the side to play sharper forward pressing.

4. Hamburger SV. When Hamburg’s coach Torsten Fink took over the side last autumn he stabilized the team in a heartbeat and led it to a long series of wins and draws. What helped a lot, I thought, was that he came with crystal-clear tactical ideas while his predecessor Michael Oenning kept switching line-ups and formations. The key element was for the full-backs to push way up while a holding midfielder drops deep between the centre-back during build-up play – which is fairly rare in Germany (mostly Borussia Dortmund and Bayern practice a variation of this). This improved Hamburg’s play when in possession but the flip-side was evident early on as well: the team was open to counter-attacks as the centre of the pitch was left to a single midfielder while the rest overloaded the wings.

Fink dropped this during the latter part of the worst season in the club’s history (the only club that is still to miss a Bundesliga season) and for the first two matches of this season. In particular seen how mediocre the defenders are, the side is a real challenge for a coach who recently saw himself on the way to becoming one of the best in Europe. Its a case where first class tactics seem the only road to success.

The last minute, desperate signing of three rather creative midfielders (Rafael van der Vart, Petr Jiracek and Milan Badelj) has changed the picture somewhat, though, and it will be interesting to see how Fink will design his sides build-up play in the end.

5. Mainz 05. Low-budget sides need a niche to survive in. Mainz 05 might not be able to compete in Bundesliga football had it not developed a bit of a tradition of employing the most modern coaches of their time. Wolfgang Frank is considered to be the coach who introduced the back four to Germany in the 1990s. It was in Mainz where Dortmund coach Jürgen Klopp could develop and refine his razor-sharp pressing over many years before combining it with individually better players in Dortmund to surge to the top of the league and leave Bayern behind for two consecutive years.

Under the current coach Thomas Tuchel, the side is Bundesliga’s most flexible one, seamlessly switching between a diamond, a 4-2-3-1 and a 4-4-2 formation. Always one to watch.

As for the two big teams, Borussia Dortmund and Bayern Munich, I think more of the same can be expected. Dortmund remains cutting edge (e.g. its pace when switching to possession, its counter pressing, the efficient use of a lopsided formation) and does not need to develop itself further at national level – at least in broad tactical terms (maybe adapt zonal marking when defending set-pieces, though?) But the league understands its (build-up) play more and more and I think it’s a mistake not to have signed the slightest competition for centre-backs Neven Subotic and Mats Hummels.

Bayern, on the other hand, has been stagnating over the past two years but its coach Jupp Heynckes is not the coach you would expect to launch revolutions. He’s moved Arjen Robben to the left wing from where he rotated in and out of the centre (switching positions with Xherdan Shaqiri) during the first match – during the previous season, the Dutch had become quite an inefficient winger slowing down his side’s pace as every side in the league had finally figured out how to block his runs outside-in from the right wing. Bayern hope that fierce competition on almost all positions will improve the side’s performance by the few percentage points it needs to win a title again. It has again thrown money at the problem by signing rivals for Mario Gomez and the midfielders – tactical innovations will occur elsewhere.

Maybe in Nuremberg, where coach Dieter Hecking routinely oversees the league’s best pressing?

Technical Difficulties...

Tue, 11 Sep 2012 14:48:06 +0200

We apologize for the inconvenience!

When we went into the summer break we did not foresee that we would run into troubles with our domain redirect. According to the tumblr staff these have finally been cleared up for good.

Hopefully we can now return to ponder the technical difficulties that influence decision making on the football pitch, rather than those that pertain to web publishing. There’s football being played in the leagues and World Cup qualifiers that just begs to be scrutinized and some new initiatives from the realm of analytics may prove to be a game changer for the way fans can chime in with models of their own. It’s gonna be an amazing season!

Greece's 1:1 vs Germany: no turning point

Thu, 28 Jun 2012 16:35:00 +0200

Greece has long gone home and, as expected, has not left a lasting impression on the tournament. Except for one scene.

Their equalizer against Germany was a perfectly executed counter-attack that will stand the text-book test of time. The attack took some three seconds to do away with the advantage Germany had built up in arduous work over the previous hour or so.

Where did this pace come from?

A surefire way to lose pace in football is when your player receives a pass facing his own goal, forcing him to turn around first before play can pick up pace again with his next pass. When there is an opponent closely marking him it’s actually a decent chance to lose the ball altogether, as very few players are able to execute this move with a marker in their back. To keep up the pace of an attack you must eliminate moves that slow down your players or the ball.

No less than five players were involved in Greece’s high speed counter-attack but not a single one of them had to turn towards the goal while on the ball. That’s why it all happened so fast. It really is text-book material. No German defender came anywhere close to interception, just like on the training pitch where you begin by studying the moves with only the ball and no defenders.

After winning possession, a central striker drops deep to receive a vertical pass from the player who has won the ball. All he does is offer himself for the wall pass to a second midfielder. Meanwhile, two wingers overrun the opposing full-backs. They’re able to do so because the full-backs still need to turn 180 degrees while the wingers don’t, the key edge here. One of them receives the pass from midfield, takes it further down the pitch at full speed and crosses it into the box where the other finishes it off. Done.

Sorry, your browser does not support iframes. We need those to display our interactive graphics.

Figure one 1: A text-book counter-attack. Fasten your seat belts and click on the button in the centre of the pitch to take off.

Greece’s goal proved no turning point for the match, obviously, as the side continued to sit deep, allowing a lot of long-range shots and crosses. More German goals were inevitable.

In the years to come Greece have the opportunity to build up a new team around a new generation of players who are hopefully able to put more emphasis on possession, at least if and when a tournament or match requires it. For now, it has impressed with a single attack, beautiful in its simplicity. I’m going to remember this one.

Visualizing the Intangibles: Creating Space and Chances with Mario Gomez

Thu, 21 Jun 2012 16:52:00 +0200

By now statistical analysis has entered popular football discourse, but the development of quantifiable variables that have a tangible effect on the outcome of games is rudimentary at best. We have goals scored as the single reliable determiner of who wins a match but we have few data points that help us predict how these goals are scored. Still, pundits tend to focus on data that enters the discussion for the single reason that it is easily quantifiable. A player who has recorded few touches per game can easily be seen as a lazy bum not pulling her weight. However, this need not be true.

Good pundits tend to rise above statistics and point out observations for which we need a bit of football experience to decipher their impact on the game. In football today, many variables that experience tells us are influential are hard to quantify. The US sports scene that has been enamored with statistics much longer than football calls these variables intangibles.

One such observation of an intangible that divided opinions during the Euro 2012 was provided when former Bayern international Mehmet Scholl lambasted Mario Gomez for his work ethic, or rather lack thereof, in the game against Portugal. In defense of Gomez it has to be said that his motor was not the problem and that he did a pretty good job putting pressure on the Portuguese full backs both in offense and defense. He even has the numbers to prove it, if you merely look at his running distance.

What Gomez lacks is a good sense of when it is more productive for an attack to help out in build-up in the final third of the pitch, rather than battle for position in the box. If he could ever improve in that area he would reach a whole new level of striker quality: he would help the team create the very chances he is so apt at converting. Granted, he may not have the light feet, the sense of space and passing quality that Klose brings. But that shortcoming may be secondary, given his clinical production. He could score even more if only he were to actually look to contribute to the build-up when working the box or the offside trap does not yield a promising scoring position. Dragging defenders out of position and serving as an outlet for unambitious one-twos is well within his technical ability.

Incidentally, in the match against the Netherlands, it were those intangibles that are so hard to quantify, that allowed Gomez to put two past the Dutch keeper. In terms of his numbers outside of goals and distance covered he looked conspicuously absent from the stat sheet. He still did not contribute to build up play through time on the ball. In fact, his numbers were atrocious: he was the player with the fewest touches on the pitch by far. But he did provide the kind of runs off-the-ball that eventually created space for his teammates to move into and play the two through balls to Gomez that he converted with flair.

Sorry, your browser does not support iframes. We need those to display our interactive graphics.figure one: exploit the marking movement of the opposition (5 scenes. click on the button in the center of the pitch to start)

One thing should be noted about his tournament performance. It was quite clear that his outworldly conversion rate of one goal for every other attempt from the first two games was not sustainable. In the game against Denmark the mean of Gomez very own bell curve eventually caught up with him. Even though he may be more efficient in front of goal than most, his efficiency is still governed by the laws of probability and the huge amount of things that can go wrong for a striker on the football pitch. Be it that on his next ten chances the grass will make the ball wobble just a tad more, be it that the keeper successfully gambles to make a save, there is just too much outside of Gomez’ control that has to go right for him to keep up the scoring efficiency from his first two games. That is the main reason why Gomez needs to be prolific in other areas than finishing.

Even though his movement improved further in the third game against Denmark there were clear signs of him choosing the path towards the goal a bit too early. A couple of times Özil was looking for him to drop back for the give and go, which Gomez turned into a dummy move that surprised not just his marker but clearly also the unsuspecting Özil, who then lost the ball in a misplaced passing attempt.

Sorry, your browser does not support iframes. We need those to display our interactive graphics.figure two: passing stats from the Denmark game (2 scenes. click on the button to start. stats via fourfourtwo stats zone app)

With just 24 touches on the ball and fewer passes (16 completed) still, there is a lot of room for Gomez to improve. At least he did more work off the ball than in this tournament yet, even if it was not with the kind of purpose to get the offense flowing. The question remains whether his finishing really offsets his weakness in terms of build-up play. From the limited data alone we can not make a sound statistical prognosis. All we have to go on is the clear observation that Klose still links up better with the midfield. But we can also see that from each game as a starter Gomez has been slowly improving on his weakness.

Spain vs Italy: beyond the 4-2-3-1

Sat, 16 Jun 2012 19:15:00 +0200

From a tactical perspective this match has been one of the most interesting ones in a long time. Italy mostly tried to close down the centre with its back three, which resulted in a relative dearth of scoring opportunities for arguably the best team of the world.

Both sides played quite differently from the mainstream 4-2-3-1 formation widely employed today, both in their very own ways. Here is a quick breakdown into different aspects.

Formations

A 3-5-2 clashed with a kind of 4-3-3, or 4-6-0.

Italy played a back three, into which the outer midfielder on the far side of the ball would drop to form a back five at times. It fielded three central midfielders, with Andrea Pirlo playing in between Marchisio and Motta, just a little further back.

Spain fielded a back four, coalescing into a back three when in possession by Busquets dropping between the centre-backs while the full backs advanced. This shift was less pronounced than during previous tournaments, though. I think it may have been to safeguard against the threat of Italian counter-attacks with their strikers moving wide.

Busquets, Xavi and Xabi Alonso distributed the ball from midfield. It was mostly Iniesta who provided linking up with Fabregas higher up the pitch from his unique avenue on the left, halfway between the sideline line and the centre of the pitch. Silva was assigned to work the right flank but often moved inside as well.

Strikers

Maybe the most obvious point of distinction between both sides was their respective use of strikers. Italy fielded two of them, an interesting combination of the athletic Balotelli and the street-smart Cassano. Balotelli mostly held the centre while Cassano kept drifting towards both wings.

Spain fielded none, with Fabregas playing up-front but mostly acting as primus inter pares in Spain’s tiki-taka play – not as a player with providing outlet as a target set distinctively apart from the others midfielders.

Style of play

Spain’s link-up play is well known. Its main modus operandi is to penetrate the box vertically with short-range passes, with runners looking to get behind the defense to receive them.

Other important attack elements are virtually absent from Spain’s play, such as crosses and balls across the opponent’s back four. I’m no big fan of such a limited avenue of attack as it lacks punch up-front and makes it easier for the defenders to protect the goal because they can be certain there won’t be any long passes into their back and never need to hedge. Unless, of course, you’re Spain and you therefore possess the needed technical and passing skills to make it work anyways. But still Spain’s attack gained a lot of extra traction with the substitution of Torres, serving as a more traditional outlet high up.

On balance (i.e. Andrea Pirlo aside), Italy’s play was also a collective production without any dominant figure and a build-up play consisting of technically savvy passing over short distances, much like that of Spain. But its style of play was much more varied as the team could also suddenly pick up the pace by seeking out its strikers straight away with a well timed long ball. Pirlo injected some nifty passes chipped over Spain’s back four.

Pressing

Neither team played pressing exactly, but both attacked quite high up the pitch in the opponent’s half during much of the game – in particular after losing possession.

I think both formations are suitable for pressing. As has often been noted the meticulous Spanish link-up play is certainly more geared towards pressing immediately after possession is lost than the style of the Italians with their quick attacks using wide strikers, because the Spaniards naturally will have more players in the ball zone during a turnover.

Wingers

Neither side fielded classical forward wingers. The rise of the winger seemed a given for much of the 2000s, but today even average teams can isolate classic wingers fairly easily with a wide four in midfield. If build-up play is not super fast, the outer players can back up the full-backs almost always on time. Amongst the most ineffective players so far at this tournament have been wingers like Arjen Robben and Christiano Ronaldo.

Summary

I’d almost say Italy was tactically superior. They adapted well to Spain’s tiki-taka by shutting down the space outside their box with two rows of three plus two outer midfielders sitting deep on both sides. They also managed to exploit a Spanish weakness by launching counter-attacks into the space behind the Spanish full-backs from time to time. This kept Spain on the edge for most of the game.

But thanks to their superior passing skills Spain still managed to threaten the Italian goal ever so often. They kept pushing through their own style of play against an opposition tailor made to exploit its weakness, which does not bode well for anybody else eyeing the title. Also, hardly any other team is as tactically astute as Italy is and the 3-5-2 can be tricky to play in particular during turnover of possession.

Advanced Youtube Scouting: Rating Mesut Özil vs Netherlands at the EURO 2012

Fri, 15 Jun 2012 16:01:00 +0200

On more than one of the tactics oriented online publications did I read that Özil had a terrific game. Some went even so far to say that it was one of his best or the best they had ever seen. I disagree.

To put matters in perspective: I am perhaps the most notorious Özil fanboy in German online football discourse. There is evidence on the internets of me likening him to Zidane and predicting greatness at least as early as spring 2009. As soon as he appeared in the Bundesliga you could point out two physical attributes that were beyond compare to anyone since the French magician: his sense of balance and his anticipation.

These two in combination allow him to control the ball in tight spaces, use feignts and play off balance passes that no one else can, simply because he has better control of his center of gravity and thus effectively more time for action on the ball. Add to that superb court vision, a gifted left foot, a modicum of work ethic and a bit of experience and you have yourself a world class player. Özil has all that and more.

Now, in the match against the Dutch Özil received praise for the kind of off-the-ball movement he brought to the game, dragging defenders out of position left and right, thus creating the kind of space that allowed his teammates to set up chances and score. I agree with that sentiment.

I disagree with the notion that, by his standards, he had a great game. I fear that there is a bias creeping into the tactics blogs that clouds their judgement for pure enjoyment of disagreeing with the mainstream. Having a fresh perspective on the game and being the hip cat on the scene should not mean we (yes, I consider myself part of that hipster crowd) should look to disagree with the TV pundits just for the sake of it.

So praising Özil for having a great game, just because he did the kind of work that goes unnoticed by the uninitiated, is bullshit. I watched almost every match that Özil played this year (just on telly it pains me to say) and I’m telling you that by his standards he had an average game at best. If you had watched him play in April, when he was at the height of his form, you could tell: Özil at his best looks like he can do no wrong.

Thanks to the wonders of the internets you actually can compare his level of competition now and then. Professional scouts use analytic systems where player actions are coded onto a database of video material. Say that for the game Germany vs Netherlands you wanted to see all instances of Özils passes being deflected for a corner kick, or all fouls committed by German players in the opposition half, the computer program gives you just those scenes to compare so that the coaching staff can analyze whatever they feel they need to address. We will have to make do with the second best, rabid fanboys who cut up scenes of their favorite player from a given game.

What we get to see, then, are just the moments where Özil does have the ball, as opposed to those off-the-ball, of which some tactics bloggers claim they made Özil their man of the match. Yet, I put it to you that when he did have the ball in the match against the Dutch, Özil was much less incisive with his passing and surging into space, and he was uncharacteristically often dispossessed on simple challenges. His time on the ball overall was put to less use than during any given game this spring. Hence, a great deal of what makes him a great player was not to the level he can be. Compare for yourself how Özil’s game looks when he is the best player on the pitch with and without the ball against pretty decent opposition:

You may want to switch off the sound of the videos if you are not into house music. Also, these fan videos on YouTube have a tendency of disappearing, so if the embeds don’t work or you would like to scout someone else, try a search of “playerX vs TeamName”. This obviously only works for high profile players.

Starting Strong vs Peaking Late in the Euro 2012

Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:55:00 +0200

One thing that struck me, watching the first round of matches played at the Euro 2012, was the performance drop that all teams displayed (to various degrees) in the second half. A decrease in both the amount of sprints and distance covered between halves is to be expected in a sport that relies heavily on physical fitness. However, having the Champions League fixtures and national cup finals as the last point of reference, where the elite teams meet on the grand stage, the level of fatigue in the European Cup is palpable.

There are a couple of elements factoring into the lack of fitness that I find apparent in the beginning stages of the tournament (unfortunately we need more intricate statistics than the bland distance covered to support this impression of mine). Attrition from a long season may be popular with the pundits, but it is not what I consider the most relevant. Attrition is mostly the accumulation of smaller injuries, which professional footballers are expected to play through. Niggling players is not what I mean when I say that the teams looked tired. Instead, physiological preparation is the key variable. The kind of preparation that allows a player to reach their peak performance come match day. Dick Advocaat, coach of the Russian side, said as much in the weeks leading up to the tournament.

A football match introduces a highly complex task demand not just for skill, but for physical endurance and strength. These attributes must be conditioned to optimally prepare a footballer for chasing the ball, working the channels and general running about the pitch. The conditioning side is not easy, given the task demand. You need more than just stamina, you need the kind of endurance that is tailor made to the player movement of elite football: The higher the level of play, the less a footballer jogs about the pitch. Instead, short bursts of runs or sprints with minimal recovery time are required. While the distance covered is only marginally higher in elite football, a lower side team on average expends less energy in sprints as opposed to jogging.

One interesting aspect about the difference in physical demand between higher and lower tier level of play is that when teams from different tiers meet the higher level team dictates the pace and thus the physical demand involved. This is already a first explanation for why at the Euro the drop off between halves is much more poignant than in league play: Players from different tiers of competition clash, forcing the players used to more recovery time and less high intensity sprints to adapt. But the human body cannot sustain an energy output it is not conditioned for over the same 90 minutes, which means that the teams featuring less stars used to Champions League level of competition are on average bound to suffer more from fatigue as a game goes on.

Another fascinating side note is that Philipp Lahm, having displayed one of the worst performances in his international career, referred to the climate conditions as “being like in a sauna.” The impact of climate (and perception thereof) on fatigue is also featured in the paper where you may find some of the science behind my observations above (Physiological Demands of Football, PDF).

While we already have a general motivation for why the intensity in second halves at the group stages of the EURO is unlikely to match that of the Champions League there is another factor that greatly influences the apparent fatigue of the group stages, even among star studded teams. The element of preparation for the EURO is heavily constrained by time. This clashes with the need for practice session to condition the players for optimal performance.

In fact, optimal physical performance in stamina is attained by meticulously planned conditioning over several weeks time, which is a luxury open to athletes who plan their schedule around preparing for key events, but not for footballers coming out of a season where their respective coaches focus on winning just then. Coaches at the EURO know this and there are several competing strategies how to approach the problem. Some try to involve a suboptimal tapering process, believing that some amount of tapering (featuring progressively lower intensity workouts towards the end of preparation) is better than none. Others believe that since you don’t have time for a proper tapering schedule anyway, your best bet is to keep the intensity high coming out of the season.

Regardless of what their methods are, it makes sense to steer the training in such a way that the peak physical performance level for the players is reached when it counts most: going into the elimination round. For all the layers of complexity in football, at least physical fitness is something that thanks to advances in sports science you can actually plan ahead for. Not all teams may have the same amount of expertise on their coaching staff, but I trust that some amount of planning for peak performance is involved for each of them.

This is another reason I suspect we have not seen many teams at their physical best (to make no mention of reaching their overall potential). For all the talk about “starting strong” into a tournament, most matches involving contenders where really a matter of not starting with a loss and not expending too much energy. For those teams, like Russia or the Croats, that did win convincingly, the lack of cohesiveness and willingness to close space in the latter stages of the game was far from convincing. Even in the best game of the tournament so far fatigue had an impact on the game: Italy dominated Spain from a tactical perspective by exploiting space with runs to the sidelines only until they tired. And they got into trouble when Spain introduced not just an element of verticality to their game that was absent before, but a fresh pair of legs to work the back line.

I would predict that the later the stage in the tournament, the greater the physical advantage of teams featuring elite players: The preparation time over the course of the tournament heavily favors the now peaking athletes, while the peak level of stamina for lower tier athletes can never catch up with them. The lower tier level players who had more time to prepare reach their peak before the elite players do. The coaches who field Champions League finalists barely had a week of practice with their full squad, practice time that over the course of the tournament will not only work to improve stamina, but also understanding among players, which also grows with each match played.

Which is to say: I believe the best is yet to come.

Further reading: The Science of Sport on Physiology of Football and the Australian Sports Commissioning on Tapering

EC 2012 Interactive Schedule

Thu, 07 Jun 2012 14:55:00 +0200

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How Joachim Löw plans to create the Özil moment

Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:39:00 +0200

German coach Joachim Löw wants to take the next step towards his vision of perfect football. At the 2010 world cup, the Mannschaft surprised with refreshing football based on high speed counter-attacks after winning possession, mostly from deep positions. The English side in particular saw the backs of pacey players like Lukas Podolski, Mesut Özil and Thomas Müller all too often.

Now Löw wants to shorten the distance to goal to be covered by his side after possession is won – by moving the crucial ball winning moment to where it really hurts: into the opponent’s half or even the last third of the pitch.

But the rare, pure fore-checking aside, possession can only be won high up the pitch in the precious seconds right after it was lost. That is, right after the winger lost the one-on-one with the full-back or right after the interception by the opposing holding midfielder. Winning the ball back high on the pitch cannot wait until after the now defending side has withdrawn to form a defensive block inside its own half. In essence, Löw wants to eliminate football’s eternal trough between attack and defense, defense and attack.

figure 1

But how does one do that?

When a team loses possession, there are two basic options. The classic one is to withdraw into one’s own half and set up the defensive shape behind the ball before the opponent has done any harm. The more modern one, aimed at by Löw, is to defend forward, in an attempt to win back the ball right where it was lost. Two vastly different approaches.

Here’s a display of the first strategy: after possession is lost, all players (give or take an offensive player) quickly move back towards their own goal, targeting an imaginary line (marked in plain white) between wherever the ball is and their own goal.

figure 2

However, there is a disadvantage of this approach as it leaves the initiative to the opponent. Your own team just reacts: once the attackers switch sides, for instance (see the pass from attacker 2 to attacker 7), the imaginary line between the ball and the goal moves, leading to unnecessary swing movements in the defenders’ runs back to the goal – see the assumed run of defender 6.

Apply this to 8 or so players simultaneously taking part in the move back and there can be a lot of runs wasted.

In this sense, attempting to win back possession when and where it got lost is much more efficient as players directly charge the ball in a straight line of fire. But needless to say, the risks are much higher. If the ball can not be recaptured right away, the opponent has acres of space in front of the last line of defenders, as everyone else is ahead of the ball, not behind it.

I think there are two strategies to minimize the risk of giving up space.

1. The team needs to act cohesively—already when in possession. To increase the chances of winning back the ball, the distance to be covered needs to be short enough to deny the opponent’s players close to the ball the time they need to free themselves from the on-setting pressure on the ball. That means that during possession the distances between all players need to be kept short (10-20 meter max) and the team needs to move across the pitch in a very cohesive way (i.e. the Barca way).

This highlights why it’s important to break down the entire game into just two states: in possession or not in possession. Sides need to prepare for one state while still in the other one, just like chess players thinking many moves ahead.

This also implies that the build-up of play either has to be deliberately slow to allow everyone to catch up, which is a strong contradiction to the widely accepted principle of keeping up the pace while passing to exploit weaknesses in the defence. Moving away from that for the sake of being able to set up counter pressing would be a crazy paradigm shift in football.

2. Immediate counter pressing after the loss of possession can only be launched on a case by case basis. I.e. when one’s own attack took place in a way that leaves enough players in the ball zone (thereby ruling this tactics out for most counter-attacking teams). But contingency also applies to where on the pitch the ball is lost. It’s fairly easy to free oneself of pressure on the ball in the centre of the pitch where there’s 360 degrees full of options to turn to. Not so on the wing, where it’s much easier to pin down the opponent.

A key role (for example at Borussia Dortmund, by far the most adept Bundesliga team at recovering possession right after it was lost) in deciding when to charge for the ball is assumed by one of the two holding midfielders in a 4-2-3-1 formation. He has a good view of the pitch in front of him and may anticipate the loss of possession a moment before every one else. Thus he may pressure the players who the ball was lost to while they are still looking to control the ball, often by linking up with the full-back. Here forward-defending often constitutes an efficient surprise element. The other players in the ball zone lend support while the players on the far side can move backwards into covering positions behind those in the vicinity of the ball.

figure 3

Involving a holding midfielder and a full-back in such an operation highlights the risks involved. If they fail (to at least force the opponent to pass the ball backwards), there’s nothing left in the way of the now attacking opponents who can proceed to attack the back line that is now missing a player.

There are combinations between both approaches as well, in particular by teams in lower leagues: once possession is lost, the players in the zone around the ball (to be defined, for instance with a radius of 15 meters from the ball) attack the ball while everyone else retreats along the lines described above. The actions of the first group will hopefully delay the opponent’s counter-attack until the second group has regrouped to an extent that it’s no longer a counter-attack.

But if the strategy fails, the risk is that the team loses cohesiveness between midfield/attackers and defense and uses resources (i.e. runs) that jeopardize the density needed closer to the box to defend the goal.

Switzerland’s first goal in the recent friendly against Germany highlighted the importance of shape even though it doesn’t serve quite well as an example for the broader issues discussed here (winning possession high up the pitch) because Germany loses the ball fairly deep in build-up play in the back of the full-back, which is always a nightmare.

A German midfielder (white shirt no. 7) loses the ball and the holding midfielder (white no. 6), around 10 meters off the ball, attacks the Swiss midfielder who the ball is lost to. But he doesn’t get anywhere close to him before the Swiss players passes the ball to his winger, into the back of the German full-back. This leaves only Per Mertesacker (white 4) between the ball and the German goal. But we’re far from the immediate vicinity of the goal, so there are options on how to defend.

figure 4

Still, Mertesacker retreats all the way to his own box where the winger puts the ball through to Eren Derdiyok who finishes it off. I think it’s a long-standing weakness of Mertesacker that he avoids one-on-ones at all cost due to his lack of maneuverability against pacey and agile players. When still at Werder Bremen he once avoided a one-on-one with Robino by retreating over some 40 metres – right up to the point where the Brazilian no longer needed the one-on-one because he was close enough anyways to finish it off with a shot from just outside the box.

Had the holding midfielder not immediately attacked the Swiss player on the ball but retreated as well, he could have linked up with Mertesacker to help him keep the Swiss winger away from the danger zone, a tactical goal Mertesacker didn’t dare to accomplish on his own.

The point being: one player charges forward, another player retreats and as a result the attacking team gets too much space to exploit in between. That’s why Löw has highlighted in interviews before the tournament that cohesiveness and short distances between all players is an absolute prerequisite to controlling a game.

To sum up the comparison, aggressive forward defending to immediately recover possession in the opponents half is risky and only works if the side acts cohesively (already during possession) and if it is implemented on a case-by-case basis. Not all situations on the pitch are equally suitable, which adds quite a bit of implementation risk because it needs a lot of training for all players to instinctively tell one from another.

But where there are risks, there are rewards. Hardly anything is won when possession is recovered deep into one’s own half, the distance to the other goal proofs too long in most cases. But there’s a lot of spoils when the ball is recovered right after it got lost in the first place: the distance to the goal is shorter and, crucially, the opponent gets caught dissolving his defensive order to counter attack.

Theories and tactics are useless if a side doesn’t boast the right players to implement them. But Germany has Mesut Özil. Very few players grasp fluid, complex situations as quickly as he does. See his brilliant display in the second leg of the champions league semi finals against Bayern Munich: when Sami Khedia won the ball, Bayern’s centre-backs and just about everyone else thought Özil would put it through to Karim Benzema. But he instead spotted Ronaldo somewhere on the edge of his vision and set him up inside the box, exploiting a rather marginal positioning error by Philip Lahm.

In the chaos following turnover of possession, Özil thrives (although obviously he can not be reduced to that). If Löw wants to increase the occurrence of change of possession in the opponent’s half, it is so he can capitalize on his most powerful offensive asset. The following chart shows what I call the Özil moment:

figure 5

Now, if there is a challenge to Özil’s skills in these kinds of situations, it’s Mario Gomez. Just like Özil is constantly the first to understand what’s going to happen next on the pitch, Gomez turns out to be the last just as reliably.

That’s why it is so crucial for Özil in particular and for the German game in general that Miroslav Klose finds the excellent shape he was in at Lazio earlier this year before his injuries. He may not be as nimble as he was five years ago, but over the past ten years he has developed from the classic German Kopfballungeheuer (a terrifying header of the ball in World Cup 2002) to a truly modern striker, boasting smart vertical runs.

This season has put to rest all my hopes that Gomez might achieve the same elevation of his game and be of any use outside the box as well. Even inside it he missed out a lot lately due to his suspect first touch/shooting technique and clumsy gear ratio.

So how much risk does Germany actually need to take?

Löw is prepared to take the risks outlined above partly because his side can field the kind of players he needs to reap in the rewards. But he also thinks that Germany’s opponents will show more respect than during the 2010 world cup and will sit much deeper to deny space to the impressive line-up of creative midfielders the Nationalmannschaft currently boasts: Mesut Özil, Bastian Schweinsteiger, Toni Kroos, Thomas Müller, Mario Götze – plus the pacey Lukas Podolski and Andre Schürrle.

I’m not sure I actually agree with this assessment. Two out of three teams in Germany’s group traditionally see themselves as creative teams with not bad an offensive line-up themselves: Portugal and the Netherlands. Secondly, the Euro (for the last time after the greedy upgrade to 24 teams next time, sadly) kicks off immediately with open, high-intensity matches that we typically only get to see at the world cup once it gets to the quarter-finals.

A lot hinges on this tactic being applied at the right time. It can not be sustained over 90 minutes anyways. If used too often it will also likely backfire as recently Germany’s back four did not display the fine-tuning needed for risky maneuvering.

An Introduction to the Interactive Chalkboard and All Things Clicky

Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:27:00 +0200

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We would like to get you engaged in football, so let’s take a hands on approach to our chalkboard animations: Whenever you see a round button on our chalkboards (or elsewhere on this blog) we’ll see to it that you can manipulate it and thusly control the animation or trigger some kind of effect. There will be other goodies, too, but for the time being we hope you can see the potential of interactive animation for yourself.

Oh, and for you mobile surfers out there we decided to forego flash so you can enjoy our football analysis wherever you are.

90 minutes in 90 seconds.

Tue, 05 Jun 2012 13:12:25 +0200

90 minutes in 90 seconds.

Manifesto of a Football Purist

Tue, 05 Jun 2012 12:07:00 +0200

When we started to work on a name for this blog project it turned out that both Johan and I were really looking to focus on the intricacies of football that translate into what we can see on the pitch. Hence the name of the blog. Now, there is some really interesting stuff happening in football off the pitch as well, be it in the stands, the dressing room or the media arena, but in the context of this blog whatever happens outside of the course of a game is only a matter of concern to us if it influences the game itself.

If there is a systematic link between stuff that happens outside of the 90 minutes we love to watch and stuff that happens inside the game, chances are we look at it. Probably more closely than is sane, but that’s the football affliction for you. The training grounds, psychology, astrophysics, heck, insights from other sports are welcome, too. Just as long as it translates to something we can observe on the pitch we may cover it.

That being said, I would like to introduce you to the Football Purist Manifesto I made my creed a while back. I may be alone in this, but my love for pure enjoyment of the game outranks any kind of club alliance. I hope this blog may help me convey that sentiment and allow me to profess my love for the beautiful game.

Respect the game. It starts and ends on the pitch. Everything else is secondary.
Learn to read the game, not the score boards.
Direct your passion towards the spirit of the game, do not be distracted by the soulless events surrounding it.
Share your passion.